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Gooden v. County Commission, 298 S.E.2d 103 (W. Va. 1982).
Pittsburgh Elevator Company v. Board of Regents, No. 15438 (W. Va. June
30, 1983).
During the survey period, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
decided two cases which will continue the trend of stripping governmental
entities of their traditional tort immunity.' In Gooden v. County Commission2
the court abolished county commission immunity from tort liability. The
court then declared in Pittsburgh Elevator Co. v. Board of Regents3 that the
state itself could be sued up to the limits of applicable liability insurance.
The plaintiff in Gooden was purportedly injured "when she stumbled and
fell over a cinderblock negligently placed in a public corridor of the Webster
County Courthouse."' In holding that the plaintiff was not barred from bring-
ing the action against the county commission, the court, speaking through
Justice Harshbarger, effectually combined the holdings of two prior decisions
in this area of the law -Long v. City of Weirton' and Boggs v. Board of Edu-
cation.8
In Long the court had abolished municipal immunity7 and in doing so had
departed from a bifurcated concept whereby a government entity was im-
mune for those functions categorized as "governmental" but was susceptible
to suit for "proprietary" functions.' The Long court found the distinction un-
' For a collection of cases representing the national trend of significantly altering the govern-
mental immunities for local political subdivisions or entities, see Ohio Valley Contractors v. Board
of Educ., 293 S.E.2d 437, 441 n.5 (W. Va. 1982).
2 298 S.E.2d 103 (W. Va. 1982).
No. 15438 (W. Va. June 30, 1983).
298 S.E.2d at 103.
214 S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1975).
244 S.E.2d 799 (W. Va. 1978), overruled, Ohio Valley Contractors v. Board of Educ., 293
S.E.2d 437 (W. Va. 1982).
1 The foundation for the abolition of municipal tort immunity was actually laid in Higgin-
botham v. City of Charleston, 204 S.E.2d I (W. Va. 1974), overruled, O'Neil v. City of Parkersburg,
237 S.E.2d 504 (W. Va. 1977), where the plaintiff alleged that the negligence of the defendants had
caused her to suffer injuries from a fall on a public street. A state statute, W. VA. CODE § 17-10-17
(1974), provides for the potential liability of a municipality which fails to keep its streets in repair.
The court found that since a municipality's immunity is derived from the common law and not
from the constitution, the legislature could rightfully narrow that immunity.
I "Governmental" functions have been defined as those:
which can be performed adequately only by the government, are more or less generally
agreed to be "governmental" in character, and so immune from tort liability .... On the
other hand, when the city performs a service which might as well be provided by a pri-
vate corporation, and particularly when it collects revenue from it, the function is con-
sidered a "proprietary" one, as to which there may be liability for the torts of... agents
within the scope of their employment.
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workable and prone to uncertainty.' Hence, while the court in Gooden readily
agreed that the operation of the Webster County Courthouse was governmen-
tal in nature, it reasserted that the distinction was no longer significant to
the immunity question."
The court had earlier decided in Boggs v. Board of Education1 that
county commissions were similar to municipal corporations in that they
should not receive immunity under the purview of article 3, section 6 of the
West Virginia Constitution. 2 Rather, the immunity accorded to county com-
missions in past years" had its source in the common law and not the constit-
ution.14 The holding in Boggs was narrow in that the court there decided the
constitutionality of a statute which exposed a county commission to suit" and
not whether the entire concept of immunity should be abrogated. With the
Gooden decision, the last vestiges of tort immunity have been removed from
county commissions in West Virginia.
Justice Harshbarger seemed especially influenced by the availability of
liability insurance to the county commissions. "Where liability insurance is
present, the reasons for immunity completely disappear."" While it may be
true that liability insurance does ease the fear of having the public treasury
looted to pay the successful claim of an individual citizen,'7 the price of that
insurance may rise as more successful suits are brought against the commis-
sions. The counties will not have the luxury-as will the state per the Pitts-
burgh Elevator Co. 8 case-of choosing which risk they will consent to being
sued upon by the selective purchase of liability insurance. The county com-
missions will be held liable for all torts proximately caused by the negligence
of employees performing their duties."
Pittsburgh Elevator Co. v. Board of Regents" is a case that is as signifi-
' 214 S.E.2d at 358.
10 298 S.E.2d at 104.
" The Boggs court held that while county commissions were not immune from suit, boards of
education, as dependent instrumentalities of the state, were. The decision was overruled by Ohio
Valley Contractors v. Board of Educ., 293 S.E.2d 437 (W. Va. 1982), wherein the court declared
that boards of education no longer are immune from suit.
'2 W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35 provides in pertinent part: "The State of West Virginia shall
never be made defendant in any court of law or equity."
"3 See, e.g., Watkins v. County Court, 30 W. Va. 657, 5 S.E. 654 (1888).
"' 244 S.E.2d at 802.
1 W. VA. CODE § 17-10-17 (1974).
" 298 S.E.2d at 105.
'T Professor Prosser lists the diversion of public money as one of the arguments invoked in
support of government immunity. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 (4th ed.
1971).
II Pittsburgh Elevator Co. v. Board of Regents, No. 15438 (W. Va. June 30, 1983).
" 298 S.E.2d at 103.
No. 15438 (W. Va. June 30, 1983).
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2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 27
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol86/iss2/27
SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTS
cant for what it says as for what it actually provides. The parents of a child
who was injured in a fall from the main stage of the Creative Arts Center at
West Virginia University instituted an action in the Circuit Court of
Monongalia County against the Board of Regents and other defendants2' in-
volved in the design and manufacture of the stage. Because of the exclusive
venue provision in the state code,' the Board of Regents was dismissed from
the action in Monongalia County and was subsequently sued in Kanawha
County by a co-defendant seeking contribution for any potential judgment
rendered against it. The co-defendant, Pittsburgh Elevator Co., then moved
the court in Monongalia County to consolidate the two suits by transferring
the original action to Kanawha County. The court consolidated the actions
but left them both in Monongalia County. Pittsburgh Elevator's complaint
was then dismissed without prejudice on the ground that venue was im-
proper in Monongalia County.
The supreme court first held that the order dismissing the complaint
without prejudice was an appealable order. "If the effect of a dismissal of a
complaint is to dismiss the action, such that it cannot be saved by amendment
of the complaint, or if a plaintiff declares his intention to stand on his com-
plaint, an order to dismiss is final and appealable."'
Chief Justice McGraw, writing for the majority, then went on to consider
the "effect of [section 29-12-51, which authorizes the State Board of Insurance
to procure liability insurance on behalf of the state, upon the exclusive venue
provisions of W. Va. Code section 14-2-2 and the specious tenet of law that
state agencies are immune from suit under W. Va. Const. art. VI, section 35."24
At this point in his opinion, Justice McGraw entered into a philosophicially-
based discussion, which Justice Neely deemed to be answering "questions
which this court has not been asked." The Chief Justice's major concern was
with the apparent irreconcilability of provisions in the state constitution. "In
the past this Court has stated that the constitutional bar to suit contained in
article VI, section 35, is apparently irreconcilable with the fundamental
rights of due process and access to the courts guaranteed by article III.'"2" His
proposition is that the separate provisions of the constitution are not so much
in conflict with each other as is the historical interpertation of one immunity
with the clear reading of the others.2 Justice McGraw would take a more
21 One of the defendants, Pittsburgh Elevator Co., was the appellant in this case.
22 W. VA. CODE § 14-2-2 (1979) provides in pertinent part: "The following proceedings shall be
brought and prosecuted only in the circuit court of Kanawha County: (1) Any suit in which ... a
state agency is made a party defendant ......
No. 15438, slip op. at 6.
24 Id. at 10-11 (citing W. VA. CODE § 29-12-5).
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esoteric view of the "state" which is accorded immunity under the state con-
stitution, relying upon concepts articulated in the early West Virginia case of
Coal & Coke Railway Co. v. Conley:28 "The state and the government of the
state are two different things, the former being an ideal person, intangible,
invisible, immutable; the latter a mere agent, and, within the spirit of the
agency, a perfect representative, but outside of that, a lawless usurper." 9 As
to the conclusion which flows from his interpretation of the supposedly irre-
concilable constitutional provisions, Chief Justice McGraw states:
Once the distinction between the state as an "ideal person, intangible, in-
visible, immuntable," and the government of the State as an agent accountable
for its wrongful acts is recognized, the asserted irreconcilability of the
freedoms guaranteed by article IH and the bar to suit contained in article VI,
section 35 loses all validity.0
The Chief Justice's thoughts on the concept of the state as an elusive en-
tity spouting inferior organs susceptible to suit may indicate the path that
later courts will take in attacking sovereign immunity in West Virginia. The
Chief Justice may have recognized the decreased utility and constitutional in-
consistencies which might result from further diminishing the immunity of
the "state" as- that entity has been defined for the greater part of this cen-
tury in West Virginia."1
The court's holding, however, was not based upon any changed notions of
the state's identity. Rather, since the appellant accepted the Board of Re-
gents' immunity as a proper statement of the law,3 2 the court examined how
that immunity was affected by the purchase of liability insurance. The court
found that "[t]he paramount justification underlying the constitutional grant
of immunity is to protect the financial structure of the State."" With the pur-
chase of liability insurance, that justification was deemed to vanish. 4 Earlier
67 W. Va. 129, 67 S.E. 613 (1910).
No. 15438, slip op. at 17 (quoting Railway Co. v. Conley and Avis, 67 W. Va. 129, 142, 67
S.E. 613, 619 (1910)).
No. 15438, slip op. at 19.
See City of Morgantown v. Ducker, 153 W. Va. 121, 168 S.E.2d 298 (1969); Stewart v. State
Rd. Comm'n, 117 W. Va. 352, 185 S.E. 567 (1936); Mahone v. State Rd. Comm'n, 99 W. Va. 397, 129
S.E. 320 (1925). Justice Harshbarger's frustration over the constraints placed upon "justice" by
constitutional immunity was expressed in his dissent to the continued immunization of school
boards in Boggs v. Board of Educ., 244 S.E.2d 799 (W. Va. 1978), overruled, 293 S.E.2d 437 (W. Va.
1982):
I perceive no countervailing interest to government of sufficient importance to
make its minions immune to suit by those who, when injured, are made just as lame as if
injured by any other corporate or private person. And, if it were not for the Constitu-
tion, I would say the same for State immunity.
244 S.E.2d at 808 (Harshbarger, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).
No. 15438, slip op. at 24.
Id. at 27.
3 Id. at 28.
[Vol. 86
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cases had declared that the legislature or an agency could not waive the con-
stitutional immunity by purchasing insurance.35 This court, however, found
that the enactment of West Virginia Code section 29-12-511 was not an attempt
by the legislature to waive immunity but a "recognition of the fact that where
recovery is sought against the State's liability insurance coverage, the doc-
trine of constitutional immunity, designed to protect the public purse, is sim-
ply inapplicable. '37
The court concluded that when an action is in effect brought against the
liability insurance coverage of a state agency, the exclusive venue provisions
of West Virginia Code section 14-2-2 do not apply 8 Since an insurance car-
rier is obligated, the court said, to control and direct the defense of such a
suit, the purpose of the statute in alleviating trouble and expense to state of-
ficials no longer was served by exclusive venue in Kanawha County.
Justice Neely agreed with this narrow holding, but "vigorously" dis-
sented to any suggestion that the state is not entitled to immunity under the
state constitution.
4 0
The obvious effect of this holding will be that more suits will be filed
against the state throughout West Virginia. Fewer suits will probably be
filed in Kanawha County, but more suits will surely be forthcoming in such
counties as Monongalia where the state has a heightened presence.
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982).
Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603 (W. Va. 1983).
The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Vir-
ginia certified three questions to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals in the case of Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co. :41 (1) whether
strict liability in tort applies when recovery is sought only for property dam-
age rather than personal injury; (2) whether strict liability is available to a
I Bradfield v. Board of Educ., 128 W. Va. 228, 36 S.E.2d 512 (1945); Utz v. Board of Educ., 126
W. Va. 823, 30 S.E.2d 342 (1944); Board of Educ. v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 116 W. Va. 503,
182 S.E. 87 (1935); Boice v. Board of Educ., 111 W. Va. 95, 160 S.E. 566 (1931).
- W. VA. CODE § 29-12-5 (1980) provides in pertinent part:
Any policy of insurance purchased or contracted for by the board shall provide that the
insurer shall be barred and estopped from relying upon the constitutional immunity of
the State of West Virginia against claims or suits.
I No. 15438, slip op. at 30. The argument could be made that if the legislature could decide which
constitutional provisions were "simply inapplicable," it would never have to waive anything.
Id. at 31.
SId.
Id. at 34 (Neely, J., dissenting).
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commercial entity; and (3) whether comparative negligence may be asserted
as an affirmative defense in strict liability actions.42 In answering all three
questions in the affirmative, the court settled issues which were "natural out-
growths"'3 of the court's decisions in Morningstar v. Black and Decker Manu-
facturing Co." and Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co.'"
The issues in the case stemmed from the damage caused by a September,
1975, fire at Star Furniture Company's business establishment. The plaintiff,
Star Furniture, had purchased a clock from the defendant for "display and re-
tail purposes;""8 it claimed that a malfunction in the clock or its wiring had
caused the fire.
The first issue addressed by the court was whether property damage,
rather than just personal injury" damages, could be recovered under a strict
liability theory. The court noted that property damage in this type of action
can be classified as: (a) damage to property other than the defective product,
(b) damage to the defective product itself and (c) loss of goodwill or profits."
That strict liability could be employed to recover damages to property other
than the defective product was a precept that the court had no difficulty in
accepting. "Ability to utilize strict liability does not depend on the fortunate
fact that the defective product did not result in personal injury. To permit
such a distinction would penalize the fortunate who escape personal injury.' 8
Every jurisdiction follows this principle, 9 but there are differences from jur-
isdiction to jurisdiction on the question of recovering damages to the defec-
tive product itself." Damage to the product, together with the loss of profits
and goodwill, was recognized by the court to be of an economic nature." Be-
cause of this element of economic loss, or loss of bargain, the court saw prin-
ciples of contract law tugging with tort principles to control the issues."
Two recent Alaska cases, both involving mobile homes, were utilized by
the court to demonstrate when strict liability would and would not apply. In
the first case,' the plaintiff had purchased a mobile home which had a leaky
roof; this condition generally reduced the value of his purchase. The Alaska
' Id. at 856.
3 d.
" 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979).
,s 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
,6 297 S.E.2d at 856. Another defendant, Hemco Corporation, had manufactured the compon-
ent parts of the clock.





52 Id. at 858.
Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976).
[Vol. 86
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Supreme Court refused to allow the plaintiff to proceed under a strict liabil-
ity theory, requiring instead that he pursue a warranty theory. In the other
case,54 the plaintiffs mobile home had been damaged by a fire caused by a
heating unit under the dwelling. The Alaska court held that the plaintiff
could proceed on a strict liability theory.
The West Virginia court adopted the distinction set forth by the Alaska
high court. If a defect in a product merely reduces that product's intrinsic
value without a sudden destructive event which causes danger to people or
other property, a strict liability theory cannot be used. However, "when a de-
fective product creates a situation potentially dangerous to persons or other
property, and loss occurs as a result of that danger, strict liability in tort is
an appropriate theory of recovery, even though the damage is confined to the
product itself."55 Finally, the court felt that its holding on the damage ele-
ment of "loss in value" also meant that a plaintiff could not recover under a
strict liability theory for lost profits and goodwill.
On the second issue, the court summarily dismissed arguments by the de-
fendant that the plaintiff, as a commercial entity, should be denied the use of
a strict liability theory since it was in a position to pass along costs of insur-
ance and judgments to its customers."' The defendant argued that the plain-
tiff here did not stand in the same position as the typical economically disad-
vantaged consumer. 8 Rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that the
focus should be on the safety of the product, and that safety would not be
promoted if a manufacturer or retailer was sanctioned differently for passing
along defective products at one level of the commercial process than at
another."
In answering the third question before it, the court decided that the doc-
trine of comparative negligence could be used against a plaintiff in a strict
liability case as an affirmative defense. 5 The court noted the "conceptual"
problems which this defense posed when used in conjunction with strict li-
ability. 1 Under a strict liability theory the safety of the product receives the
focus rather than the conduct of the defendant; hence, any negligence of the
defendant would not be considered in a way such as to easily balance it
"' Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977).
297 S.E.2d at 858 (quoting Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623
P.2d 324, 329 (Alaska 1981)).
1 297 S.E.2d at 859-60. The court stated: "The proper relationship between tort law and the
Uniform Commercial Code requires that lost profits be pursued under a warranty or contract
theory cause of action rather than strict liability."
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against the purported negligence of the plaintiff.2 Despite this technical
nicety, the court felt compelled to abide by its earlier established principle
that strict liability did not make a manufacturer an insurer of his products. 3
Thus, a consumer who substantially contributed to his own injuries while us-
ing a defective product would be barred from recovery. However, the court
excluded from the comparative negligence defense the failure to discover de-
fects or to guard against them. It held that to include those type of acts in
the defense would be to place "a burden on consumers which strict liability
was intended to remove."' 4
The significance of Star Furniture is found in the new parameters that it
gives to the strict liability theory in West Virginia. Of particular import to
future utilizers of the theory is its simultaneous expansion and limitation by
the court. The court broadened the theory's utility by including commercial
entities under its umbrella of protection, while limiting its use to particular
types of injuries. This solidification of boundaries and concepts is consistent
with the growth and development of any fledgling theory; more refinements
and innovations can be expected as the theory is tested by time and experi-
ence.
Another case involving a product liability theory during the survey
period was Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp.5 Karen Ilosky, the plaintiff and a
resident of Hancock County, was seriously injured in a single-car accident in
October, 1974. She claimed that her car went out of control in a curve be-
cause it was equipped with radial tires on the front and conventional tires on
the rear-a dangerous condition. The radial tires, manufactured by Michelin,
had originally been on the rear but were moved to the front when Ilosky's
father took the car to Ferguson Tire Service Company for the installation of
new snow tires. Miss Ilosky sued Michelin and Ferguson on two theories. First,
she claimed that Michelin and Ferguson had been negligent in failing to warn
her of the dangers related to mixing radial tires with conventional tires. Al-
ternatively, she sued on the strict liability ground that lack of such warning
was a defect which made the tires unreasonably dangerous. At trial she re-
ceived a verdict for $500,000, with the fault being apportioned seventy-five
percent to Michelin and twenty-five percent to Ferguson.
On appeal, Michelin" raised a number of issues. 7 On the question of liabil-
ity, Michelin claimed that the trial court had relied on an overly broad defini-
Id.
Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979).
297 S.E.2d at 862.
307 S.E.2d 603 (W. Va. 1983).
, The other defendant, Ferguson Tire Service Co., chose not to appeal.
' Not all the issues assigned as error by Michelin need to be discussed. The court found
either no validity or harmless error in every point brought up by the appellant. Its application of
established law is best illustrated by the fact that 11 of the case's 20 syllabus points were ex-
[Vol. 86
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 27
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol86/iss2/27
SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTS
tion of "defect" and had erred in allowing the plaintiff to proceed on both
theories of negligence and strict liability.
The plaintiffs theory of the case and the court's decision were natural ex-
tensions of Morningstar v. Black and Decker Manufacturing Co.,68 in which
the court adopted strict liability for West Virginia. In Morningstar the court
had stated that "a defective product may fall into three broad, and not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive, categories: design defectiveness, structural defec-
tiveness, and use defectiveness arising out of the lack of, or the adequacy of,
warnings, intructions, and labels."89 The plaintiff, Ilosky, did not allege that
the tires were designed defectively or that they were manufactured such as
to be defective; rather, she claimed that Michelin's and Ferguson's attempts
to warn her of the dangers inherent to mixing conventional and radial tires
were inadequate and consequently did not meet the legal standard. The court
noted that in order "[flor the duty to warn to exist, the use of the product
must be foreseeable to the manufacturer or seller. ' 7' The court then deferred
to the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's use of the product was foresee-
able." Hence, the defendants were found to have a duty to warn.
The appellant objected to the trial court's instruction as to the scope of
its duty to warn. 2 The evidence showed that Michelin had been aware of the
danger of mixing the tires and had mentioned that danger in company litera-
ture. Nevertheless, for someone in the plaintiffs position, the warnings were
found to be inadequate. Ilosky had purchased her car with the Michelin radial
tires already on it. Furthermore, Ferguson was not an official Michelin
dealer. Thus, although it was found to be foreseeable that someone in Ilosky's
situation could obtain Michelin radials and mix them with conventional tires,
no provision had been made for a warning of the resultant dangers to reach
such a user.
The court emphasized that it did not interpret the jury's decision as find-
ing that the only way to adequately warn a user was to put a warning on the
tires. 3 Noting that was not the issue, the court said the focus should be on
tracted from earlier cases. The court reaffirmed its holding that per diem arguments could not be
presented to the jury. Also, the court held that a plaintiff did not have to forego the collateral
source rule to recover prejudgment interest.
253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979).
Id. at 682.
70 307 S.E.2d at 609.
" Id. at 610.
2 The appellee's instruction, which was accepted by the court, read:
The seller of a product has the duty to:
1. Warn that the product, even if harmless or safe in itself, is, when mixed or used
in conjunction with another product, dangerous or potentially dangerous to users, where
it is reasonably foreseeable that uninformed users may mix the products.
Id. at n.6.
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whether Michelin's efforts to warn were adequate;" moreover, that question
should be decided by the jury."5
The appellant further objected to the trial court allowing the jury to con-
sider the plaintiff's case under both a theory of negligence and a theory of
strict liability. It argued that the plaintiff should be forced to choose which
theory to pursue. The court disagreed. It stated that a product liability suit
could be prosecuted under three theories-strict liability, negligence and
warranty." "To permit plaintiffs to plead alternative causes of action, but to
force them to choose one theory to submit to the jury after the taking of evid-
ence would force some plaintiffs to forego the strict liability cause of action if
they believed they had stronger negligence or warranty cases."" The court
concluded that it would allow as many theories to go to the jury as were sup-
ported by the evidence."
Although the court disposed of most of the issues raised in Michelin by
the application of established law, including a deferential standard to find-
ings by the trier of fact, this case does indicate the broadness with which the
court defines a manufacturer's duty to warn the public of potential dangers
stemming from its product. If a product, though not dangerous in and of it-
self, could become dangerous when used in a foreseeable manner, then the
manufacturer should take steps to ensure that a warning gets into the hands
of that consumer. Depending upon the product and its means of distribution,
the warning may have to be of the type which could overcome the foresee-
able nonfeasance of a middleman.
III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Wells v. Smith, 297 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1982).
Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8 (W. Va. 1982).
The question of whether a defendant can be assessed punitive damages
and no compensatory damages while his co-defendants are assessed both was
answered in the affirmative in Wells v. Smith." The plaintiffs (appellants) in-
stituted a civil conspiracy action against John Settimio and various other de-
fendants as a result of the theft of jewels and rare coins from their home. Set-
timio allegedly became involved after the theft in efforts to "fence" the
stolen goods. Evidence at the trial showed he was a lesser actor in the al-
leged conspiracy. While the civil trial resulted in large compensatory and
74Id.
75 Id.
7' Id. at 613.
SId.
78 Id.
11 297 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1982).
[Vol. 86
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punitive damages being assessed against Settimio's co-defendants, Settimio
was found liable for $10,000 in punitive damages only. Upon motion, the trial
court set aside that part of the award directed, against Settimio.
On appeal, the appellee, Settimio, argued that since the punitive damages
did not bear a "reasonable relation" to the compensatory damages, the trial
court did not err in striking that portion of the plaintiffs' award. He relied on
the "reasonable relation" rule as set forth in the 1946 case of Toler v. Cassi-
nelli. The court, after reviewing the history of punitive and compensatory
damages in this country and in West Virginia in particular, concluded that
the statement of the rule in Toler was flawed. The court quoted the following
language from a case decided twenty-six years before Toler which the Toler
court had relied upon: "[Plunitive damages are proper only where compensa-
tory damages are ailowable, and they must bear some reasonable proportion
to the actual damage sustained."'" The Toler court interpreted this language
as stating that an award for punitive damages must be in a reasonable pro-
portion to the compensatory damages awarded.2 The court in Wells found
the better interpretation to be that punitive damages may be awarded where
there is evidence of actual damage to the plaintiff.' Thus, the validity of the
punitive award does not depend upon the amount of actual damages actually
recovered.
Having found that the reasonable relation rule had been overstated in
West Virginia, the court then offered a mild criticism of the rule as it existed
in any form.' In the court's opinion, an emphasis on the mathematical ratio of
the respective awards failed to properly prioritize the role of punishment in
the jury's award. It found the idea of punishment to be reason enough to sup-
port punitive damages "in cases where the defendant's conduct has been
egregious but where the plaintiff has suffered indeterminate or nominal dam-
ages." The court reaffirmed language recently set forth in Leach v. Bis-
cayne Oil and Gas Co.88 which states that a jury should consider the totality
of the circumstances in awarding punitive damages. The court also noted a
129 W. Va. 591, 41 S.E.2d 672 (1946).
51 Newman v. Robson & Prichard, 86 W. Va. 681, 685, 104 S.E. 127, 128 (1920).
129 W. Va. at 601, 41 S.E.2d at 674.
297 S.E.2d at 880.
4 Id. at 878.
SId.
289 S.E.2d 197 (W. Va. 1982).
6 "[I]n assessing [punitive] damages, the trier of fact should take into consideration all of the
circumstances surrounding the particular occurrence including the nature of the wrongdoing, the
extent of the harm inflicted, the intent of the party committing the act, the wealth of the perpet-
rator, as well as any mitigating circumstances .... " 297 S.E.2d at 878 (quoting Leach v. Biscayne
Oil & Gas Co., 289 S.E.2d 197, 201, which had quoted Leimgruber v. Claridge Assocs. Ltd., 73 N.J.
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trend in its recent decisions away from a strict adherence to the "reasonable
relation" rule. 8
Although the court criticized the "reasonable relation" rule, it was not
willing to allow a jury a completely free hand in dispensing punitive dam-
ages. "[W]here the award of punitive damages has no foundation in the evid-
ence so as to evince passion, prejudice or corruption in the jury ... the award
[should] be set aside as excessive."89 In this case the court found the "founda-
tion in the evidence" to be tied to the civil conspiracy theory upon which the
plaintiffs prosecuted their claim."8 It found the instruction tendered by the
plaintiffs, and refused by the trial court, to be a correct statement of the law:
the acts by members of a civil conspiracy are the acts of all.91 Hence, evidence
of Settimio's implication in the civil conspiracy and the rendering of compen-
satory damages against his co-conspirators provided the basis for the puni-
tive award against him. The civil conspiracy theory was significant only in
that it allowed the evidence of actual damage to be imputed to Settimio.
As an added note, the court remarked that it did not address the issue of
"whether an independent cause of action lies for punitive damages .... -1 It
did, however, indicate that recent decisions pointed in that direction. 3 Such a
development would be contrary to the established principle of tort law that
the tortious act must have caused damage. 4
Less than a month after the Wells decisions was handed down, the court,
in Perry v. Melton,"5 declared that the estate of a deceased tortfeasor could
be held liable for punitive damages. This case stemmed from a violent car ac-
cident in which the appellant's decedent and the tortfeasor were killed. Since
the deceased tortfeasor was found to be intoxicated at the time of the acci-
dent, the administratrix of the victim's estate asked that the jury be in-
structed to consider punitive damages. The trial court ruled that punitive
damages would serve no purpose against a dead tortfeasor since the sole
motivation for assessing punitive damages, in its opinion, is to punish the
wrongdoer." The administratrix appealed the denial of her instruction.
Mauck v. City of Martinsburg, 280 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 1981), holding that the insulting
words statute authorized the recovery of damages without proof of actual harm; Harless v. First
Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 289 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982), allowing recovery for emotional distress
without proof of physical trauma.
' 297 S.E.2d at 880.
9 Id.
91 Id.
I Id. at 881.
'N See Mauck v. City of Martinsburg, 280 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 1981); Harless v. First Nat'l
Bank in Fairmont, 289 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982).
, W. PROSSER, HANDBOCK 0F THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
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Justice Harshbarger, writing for a unanimous court, found that punitive
damages served other purposes than the mere punishment of the individual
wrongdoer. He concentrated on the general deterrent to society and the addi-
tional compensation afforded to the aggrieved party.' Harshbarger espec-
ially relied upon Hensley v. Erie Insurance Company," where the court found
that punitive damages provided the plaintiff with an "extra measure of re-
covery" for a defendant's outrageous and wanton conduct.99 In light of the
emphasis put on the extended compensation of the wronged plaintiff, the
court could not find "sufficient justification ... for denying punitive damages
simply because the tort-feasor is dead."'' 0
The court's expansive perception of the role of punitive damages can only
lead to their greater utilization by the bar in West Virginia, especially where
a defendant's conduct is deemed to be outrageous or grossly wanton.
IV. INSURANCE
Meadows v. Employers'Fire Ins. Co., 298 S.E.2d 874 (W. Va. 1982).
In Meadows v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co."' the court reexamined for the
first time in more than fifty years the standard fire policy limitation for filing
suit. The appellant, Acel Meadows, was the owner of a building, insured by
the appellee, which was damaged by fire on or about April 15, 1972. His insur-
ance claim was denied on October 17, 1972; he did not file suit until February
21, 1979. The Circuit Court of Braxton County dismissed the appellant's suit
on the ground that the action was barred by the twelve-month limitation on
actions specified in the fire insurance contract. On appeal the appellant
argued that the ten-year statute of limitations for written contracts should




The court, speaking through Justice Miller, rejected appellant's argu-
ment that the ten-year general statute of limitations for contracts should
apply to this case."3 The court held that the state legislature, in adopting the
text of the New York Standard Fire Policy and its one-year limitation period,
had specifically rejected the longer limitation term for insurance policies."4
The court then turned its attention to the question of just when the one-year
period set forth in the policy begins to run.
Id. at 13.
283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1981).
Id. at 233.
299 S.E.2d at 13.
"' 298 S.E.2d at 874 (W. Va. 1982).
"'Id. at 875.
103 Id.
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The court noted that it had last addressed the issue in Kirk v. Firemen's
Insurance Company of Newark.' The Kirk court held that the one-year limi-
tation on actions must be read together with the provision in the policy which
states that payment shall be due sixty days after proof of loss."0 Hence,
in Kirk the court announced the rule that the one-year limitation on actions
does not begin to run until sixty days after the proof of loss.' The insurance
company in Meadows relied upon Kirk and Prete v. Royal Globe Ins. Co.10 8 in
arguing that actions are barred one year and sixty days from the date of
loss.' The court declared first that Kirk could be interpreted as allowing a
longer period than one year and sixty days from the date of loss;"' the Kirk
court focused on the date the proof of loss was returned to the company, not
the date of loss. Secondly, the court declared that the Kirk court had been
derelict in examining all the wording of the loss payable clause in the stan-
dard policy."'
The Meadows court, upon careful reading of the loss payable clause,
found that the wording was such that the insurer did not automatically have
a duty to pay the insured's claim sixty days after the proof of loss was re-
ceived by the company.' Rather, the court's interpretation of the clause was
that the proof of loss had to be received and "ascertainment of the loss...
made either by agreement between the insured and this Company expressed
in writing or by the filing with this Company of an award as herein
provided.""' Both of these conditions had to be satisfied before the insurer
105 107 W. Va. 666, 150 S.E. 2 (1924).
The language of the policy clauses between Kirk and Meadows changed little. The present
language of the limitation of suit clause is as follows:
No suit or acLion on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any
court of law or equity unless all the requirements of this policy shall have been complied
with, and unless commenced within twelve months next after inception of the loss.
298 S.E.2d at 876 n.7. The present loss payable clause provides:
The amount of loss for which this Company may be liable shall be payable sixty days
after proof of loss, as herein provided, is received by this Company and ascertainment of
the loss is made either by agreement between the insured and this Company expressed
in writing or by the filing with this Company of an award as herein provided.
298 S.E.2d at 876 n.8.
107 W. Va. at 666, 150 S.E. at 2.
"' 533 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. W. Va. 1982). The Prete case points out the confusion which the
one-year limitation period can produce. A landlord had brought suit against his insurance com-
pany on October 11, 1979, for a water damage claim, the source of which he discovered in July,
1978. The court, citing Kirk as implicitly holding that the limitation period was one year plus 60
days from the date of loss (or discovery of loss), ruled that the action was time barred. But Kirk
did not hold that the 60 days ran from the date of loss; rather, it stated that the 60 days and the
year commenced to run from the date of the proof of loss. Clearly, the Prete court misread Kirk.
1" 298 S.E.2d at 877.
110 Id.
"1 107 W. Va. at 666, 150 S.E. at 2.
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was obligated to pay under the terms of the policy. As a result, the court con-
cluded that the better rule was to toll the running of the one-year limitation
until the insurer had given written notice to the insured of the claim denial.114
Finally, the court summarily dismissed any argument that a clause of a
legislatively approved contract, such as the standard fire policy, could be
against public policy as unconscionable. Unconscionability, the court said,
was usually a result of disparity in the bargaining positions of the respective
parties.1 '5 The court found no bargaining to have occurred here.
V. COMMON CARRIERS
Adkins v. Slater, 298 S.E.2d 236 (W. Va. 1982).
In deciding Adkins v. Slater,"' the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals did not take any radical departures from the law governing common
carriers. Indeed it applied law which has been settled for more than a hun-
dred years.1
The appellants were the owners of a mobile home located in Putnam
County, West Virginia. Wanting to move their home to another parcel of
property, they retained the appellees, Benjamin Moles and Claude Slater
(Slater was doing business as Buster's Garage), to do the moving. On May 31,
1978, the appellees attempted to move the mobile home. As a result of their
efforts, the mobile home sustained damage which prevented it from being
transported more than a short distance from the starting point. The damaged
dwelling, which was blocking street traffic, was impounded by the Putnam
County Sheriff's Office and sold when the appellants were unable to pay the
resulting costs. To recover their damages, the appellants brought suit
against the two movers in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. The appell-
ants then appealed from a verdict directed against them by the trial court on
the ground that they had failed to establish a prima facie case for negligence.
The supreme court, in a per curiam opinion, declared that the trial court
had erred in deciding as a matter of law that the appellees were not common
law common carriers and therefore were not in the position of an insurer for
the goods they carried.1 The court also found that the* trial court should
have allowed the issue of the appellees' negligence to go to the jury.1
114 Id.
115 Id.
298 S.E.2d 236 (W. Va. 1982).
"t The court cited several older cases. See Maslin v. B. & 0. R.R. Co., 14 W. Va. 180 (1878);
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Morehead, 5 W. Va. 293 (1872); Brown v. Adams Express Co., 15 W.
Va. 812 (1879).
,t 298 S.E.2d at 240.
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First, the court dusted off a couple of old West Virginia cases which set
forth the definition of a common law common carrier" ° and which point out
the broadness of the category.12 The court then determined that the trial
court should have allowed the jury to decide if the appellees were acting as
common carriers. "What constitutes a common carrier is a question of law,
but whether a party in a particular instance comes within the class is a ques-
tion of fact, to be determined as the case may arise.""
Assuming the appellees were found to be acting as common carriers, the
court would also apply the common law rule'that the carrier was strictly
liable for damages caused to goods under his care, with a few exceptions.'"
One of these exceptions to this rule applies if a defect in the good itself
caused the damage. The appellees argued that it was not their negligence but
a tire blowout on the mobile home which caused the damage. The court recog-
nized the defense but added that "[i]f they are able to prove that there was a
defect in the mobile home which caused or contributed to the damages, they
must also prove that by the exercise of due care they could not have pre-
vented the damage." '24
The court agreed with the trial court's refusal to apply the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. The appellants had not proved two of the three elements es-
sential to that doctrine.1  The appellants did not show that the appellees
were in exclusive control of the instrumentality which caused the damage,
nor did they present evidence "that the injury in this case was such that in
the course of events would not have happened had the appellees used due
care."
126
The court, however, did find that the appellants should have been al-
lowed to send the issue of negligence to the jury."2 The moving of a mobile
' Maslin v. B. & 0. R.R. Co., 14 W. Va. 180 (1878).
121 Brown Shoe Co. v. Hardin, 77 W. Va. 611, 87 S.E. 1014 (1916).
122 298 S.E.2d at 240 (quoting State v. Vaughan, 97 W. Va. 563, 568, 125 S.E. 583, 585 (1924)).
" In McGraw v. B. & 0. R.R. Co., 18 W. Va. 361 (1881), the court stated in syllabus point one:
A common carrier at common law is liable for the loss or damage to goods received for
transportation from whatever cause arising, except the act of God, the public enemy or
the conduct of the owner of the goods unless such loss or damage arises from the nature
and inherent character of the property carried, provided he has used foresight,
diligence, and care to avoid such damage and loss.
"2 298 S.E.2d at 241.
"2 In syllabus point two of Royal Furniture Co. v. City of Morgantown, 263 S.E.2d 878 (W.
Va. 1980), the court said:
Before the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable, three essentials must exist: 1) the
instrumentality which causes the injury must be under the exclusive control and man-
agement of the defendant; 2) the plaintiff must be without fault; and, 3) the injury must
be such that in the ordinary course of events it would not have happened had the one in
control of the instrumentality used due care.
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home is not so complex, according to the court, as to require expert testi-
mony to establish the standard of care." In addition, "in common carrier
cases, evidence of delivery to the carrier of goods in good condition and their
delivery to the consignee in bad condition makes out a prima facie case of
negligence.""
For West Virginia, this case might seem aberrational in one respect-the
vintage of the authority relied upon by the court. It appears, however, that at
least one area of the law from the Victorian age -the duties placed upon com-
mon carriers-is compatible with the present court's ideology.
VI. MASS TORT CLASS ACTIONS
Burks v. Wymer, 307 S.E.2d 647 (W. Va. 1983).
Although class actions are not a common occurrence in West Virginia, 0
the state's highest court recently injected new blood into the rule of civil pro-
cedure under which class actions may be maintained.
In Burks v. Wymer"' the court was faced with issues stemming from the
denial of the appellant's motion to proceed by class action in the Circuit
Court of Kanawha County. Mrs. Thomas Burks, the appellant, had sought to
represent a class of Charleston homeowners whose homes and personal prop-
erty were purportedly damaged by the negligent or intentional acts of adja-
cent but higher located landowners. The appellees, who jointly owned the ad-
jacent property, had allegedly altered the topography of their land in such a
way as to cause the properties below to be damaged by rockslides and floods.
Mrs. Burks, as one of the injured homeowners, appealed the denial of her
class action motion.
The court initially noted that under the 1938 version of Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,'32 which was similar to West Virginia Rule
23,' three types of class actions were authorized: true, hybrid and
spurious. The court placed Mrs. Burks' proposed class action under the
type labeled "spurious." Referring to Moore's Federal Practice,1 the court
defined spurious class actions "as a class action where the character of the
right is several and a common question of law or fact is presented and a com-
mon relief is sought.""3 It then concluded that a mass tort class action, such
12 Id.
13Id.
' Burks v. Wymer, 307 S.E.2d 647, 652. The court notes the rarity of class actions.
13 Id.
112 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
12 W. VA. R. Civ. P. 23.
"u 307 S.E.2d at 652 n.6.
' 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.0411] (2d ed. 1982).
12 307 S.E.2d at 649 (citing 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
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as Mrs. Burks', "must fall into this category of class actions, as the claims of
plaintiffs in a tort action are, by their nature, several as opposed to joint,
common or secondary."
13 7
Justice McHugh, writing for the court, compared the 1938 and 1966 ver-
sions of Federal Rule 23 and found that the latter version was more restrictive
of the so-called "spurious" class action in that it required a finding that com-
mon issues predominated the action and a determination that the class action
was superior to other methods of bringing the suit."' The 1938 and West
Virginia versions of the rule contained no predominance or superiority re-
quirements.
The 1966 version of Federal Rule 23 authorizes mass tort class actions
under part (B)(3) of that rule. 39 As mentioned, that provision requires findings
of predominance and superiority; it also lists four factors to be considered in
deciding the predominance and superiority questions.' In adopting nine fac-
tors"' for West Virginia trial courts to consider before allowing a "spurious"
137 Id.
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 provides in relevant part:
(a) Prerequisites to class action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interest of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition...
(3) The court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of
members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
W. VA. R. Civ. P. 23 provides in relevant part:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it im-
practicable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly
insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the
character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is ... (3) several,
and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common
relief is sought.
"3 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
140 Id.
' The court set forth nine factors which should be considered in deciding whether to allow a
"spurious" class action under W. VA. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3):
(1) whether common questions of law or fact predominate over any questions af-
fecting only individual members;
18
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class action to proceed, the court incorporated the four factors found in the
federal rule. Hence, the new Federal Rule 23 and the West Virginia Rule 23,
as modified by the court's nine factors, would appear on their faces to be
roughly equivalent in nature and effect. However, the court deemed it un-
necessary for West Virginia to adopt the strict federal approach to the fin-
dings of predominance and superiority. "West Virginia courts do not face the
flood of class actions which the federal courts seek to limit by rigid require-
ments. Accordingly, We adopt a more flexible approach.""' Having said that,
however, the court did not specify the level of scrutiny which WVould apply to
the determination of these two crucial issues. Instead, West Virginia Rule
23(a)(3) is left somewhere between the 1938 rule, which required no findings
of predominance and superiority, and the 1966 rule which requires absolute
findings. By stopping short of the strict structure of the federal rule, the
court appears to be signalling that its forum will be more receptive to "spur-
ious" or mass tort class actions than the federal court system.
The court also declared that when a class action motion is before a court,
that court can direct limited discovery to take place regarding the propriety
of bringing the class action. This discovery, however, cannot reach the merits
of the case."4
Bryan R. Cokeley
(2) whether other means of adjudicating the claims and defenses are practicable or
inefficient;
(3) whether a class action offers the most appropriate means of adjudicating the
claims and defenses;
(4) whether members not representative parties have a substantial interest in in-
dividually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(5) whether the class action involves a claim that is or has been the subject of a
class action, a government action, or other proceeding;
(6) whether it is desirable to bring the class action in another forum;
(7) whether management of the class action poses unusual difficulties;
(8) whether any conflict of laws issues involved pose unusual difficulties; and
(9) whether the claims of individual class members are insufficient in the amounts
or interests involved, in view of the complexities of the issues and the expenses of the
litigation, to afford significant relief to the members of the class.
307 S.E.2d at 652.
142 Id.
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